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IN PRAISE OF PROCEDURE: AN ECONOMIC AND
BEHAVIORAL DEFENSE OF SMITH v. VAN
GORKOM AND THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT
RULE
Lynn A. Stout*

Every year, corporate law professors across the nation present their
students with a doctrinal enigma. Case law declares that corporate directors
owe their firms a fiduciary duty of care. In other words, directors must
manage the firm with the care of the "reasonably prudent person." Yet the
same case law holds that directors may not be held liable for negligent decisions. Instead, their conduct is tested under a different and far more lenient
standard-the standard of the business judgment rule.'
The business judgment rule is perhaps best summarized as a ban
against courts second-guessing the substantive quality of disinterested corporate directors' decisions. In gauging whether or not directors have fulfilled their duty of care in a particular transaction, the rule permits judges to2
consider only the quality of the board's decision-making procedures.
. Professor of Law, University of California at Los Angeles School of Law.
Much of the work on
this Article was completed while I was Professor of Law and Director of the Sloan Project on Business
Institutions at the Georgetown University Law Center. I would like to thank both the Sloan Foundation

and the Law Center for their support. I presented a preliminary version of my argument in May 2001 at
a conference on Van Gorkom and the Corporate Board: Problem, Solution, or Placebo? organized by
the University of Delaware Center for Corporate Governance. I am grateful to the conference participants for their insights. Finally, I am especially indebted to Stuart Banner, Stephen Bainbridge, Margaret Blair, the Hon. William B. Chandler III, Mitu Gulati, William Klein, Donald Langevoort, Lynn
LoPucki, Fred McChesney, Randall Thomas, and the Hon. Leo E. Strine, Jr., for their helpful comments
and suggestions.
I See infra notes 17-20 and accompanying text (describing business judgment rule). As Judge
Ralph Winter has put it:
While it is often stated that corporate directors and officers will be liable for negligence in carrying
out their corporate duties, all seem agreed that such a statement is misleading.... [L]iability is
rarely imposed upon corporate directors or officers simply for bad judgment and this reluctance to
impose liability.., has been doctrinally labeled the business judgment rule.
Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982).
2 When the procedural requirements of the business judgment rule have been met, courts will only
pass judgment on the wisdom of a board's decision if a transaction is so disadvantageous to the firm that
no reasonable person could deem it fair. See infra note 21 (discussing doctrine of waste); see also
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 262-64 (Del. 2000) (suggesting that business judgment rule requires
"process due care" while waste doctrine inquires into "substantive due care"). A similar standard has
been suggested in a recent article by two sitting Delaware Chancellors and a former Chancellor. See
William T. Allen et al., Function over Form:A Reassessment of StandardspfReview in Delaware Cor-
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Smith v. Van Gorkom3 provides the classic example of this procedural focus. In that case, a minority shareholder of Trans Union claimed that the
firm's board of directors had breached its duty of care by approving a
merger in which the Trans Union shareholders would receive fifty-five dollars per share (a significant premium over the prevailing market price). To
the surprise and dismay of many in the business community, the Delaware
Supreme Court agreed-but not because the court believed that the board's
decision to sell the company was a bad decision. Rather, the directors of
Trans Union were held to have breached their duty of care because they
reached their decision too hastily, without the right information, and without asking the right questions. 4 The Trans Union directors were found liable not for what they decided but for how they decided it.
This emphasis on process opens the business judgment rule to attack
from at least two directions. The first sort of attack emphasizes what the
business judgment rule supposedly does not do-discourage director carelessness. According to this view, the business judgment rule needs to be
changed because it shields directors who follow the requisite procedures
from liability even when they make reckless, foolish, and downright stupid
decisions. The second type of attack centers on what the business judgment
rule does do-create incentives for directors to adopt elaborate and costly
decision-making routines (for example, scheduling longer meetings, keeping detailed formal records of their determinations, and hiring expensive
outside consultants). The result, critics charge, is unnecessary delay and
expense that ultimately harms the firm and its shareholders.5
Taken together, these two critiques amount to a claim that the business
judgment rule imposes substantial costs on firms and shareholders without
providing any offsetting benefit. In judging the persuasiveness of this
claim, it is important to recognize that the second part of the critique (the
charge that the business judgment rule provides no benefit) is essential to
the success of the first part (the charge that the business judgment rule imposes costs). After all, one of the first lessons of economics is that some
costs are worth incurring.
The notion that the business judgment rule provides no benefits rests,
in turn, on an unspoken but essential empirical assumption: that there is no
porale Law, 56 Bus. LAw. 1287, 1296 (2001) ("Where the business judgment standard applies, a director will not be held liable for a decision-even one that is unreasonable-that results in a loss to the corporation, so long as the decision is rational.").
3 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
4 The directors of Trans Union were denied the protection of the business judgment rule because
they approved the sale of the company based on a two-hour meeting in which they relied only on short
oral reports by the company's CEO and CFO to establish the company's value. See id. at 868-70. As a
result, the court found the directors had failed to inform themselves "of all material information reasonably available." Id. at 872.
5 Hence the deriding description of Van Gorkom as the "investment bankers' full employment doctrine." For examples of commentary hostile to the opinion, see sources cited infra notes 55-58.
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connection between better procedures and better outcomes. This assumption should look dubious to anyone with experience in the business world.
Changes in decision-making procedures often produce changes in results.6
The problem, at least from a rational choice theorist's perspective, lies in
explaining why. Economic accounts of corporate governance generally begin by assuming that shareholders, officers, and directors are rational actors
concerned only with improving their own welfare. From this rational
choice perspective, penalizing directors for following poor procedures-but
not for reaching poor decisions-seems silly. After all, if directors are rational and self-interested actors, imposing liability on them for failing to
jump through the right procedural hoops does not give them incentive to
make good decisions. It only gives them incentive to jump through hoops.
The idea of trying to encourage good results by encouraging good procedures begins to make sense, however, if we are willing to depart from rational choice analysis and, in particular, from the homo economicus model
of human behavior that underlies it. This model recently has come under
attack from many in the legal academy, as it has become fashionable to argue that people are subject to cognitive biases that impede rational decisionmaking and that law and policy should take this into account.7 In this Article, I join the "behavioral law and economics" trend, with something of a
twist. Instead of questioning the assumption that people are always rational, I question the assumption that they are always self-interested.
I argue that if we want to understand the business judgment rule, we
must begin by recognizing that the social institution of the board of directors is premised on the belief that directors are motivated, at least in part,
by altruism, in the form of a sense of obligation to the firm and its shareholders.8 Although the idea that corporate participants might have concern
for something other than their own gain is largely unaddressed in economic
6 1 am not referring here to the much-studied phenomenon of changing the outcome of majority-rule
voting by changing the order in which items are voted on. See, e.g., DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A.
STOUT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND ECONOMICS 448-454 (1992) (discussing agenda control).
Rather, I am referring to how more subtle changes in process can lead to different individual and group
decisions, even when the agenda and the applicable voting rule remain unchanged.
7 See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of
Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 (1999); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard
Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Russell B.
Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and BehavioralScience: Removing the RationalityAssumption from
Law andEconomics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000).
8 More accurately, I argue that directors exhibit "other-regarding revealed preferences." Translated
into lay terms, this means that directors behave as ifthey care not only about costs and benefits to themselves, but also about costs and benefits to others. One can hypothesize a number of subjective motives
that might trigger such behavior, including guilt, ego, moral principle, fear of divine retribution, or
mindless adherence to a particular social role. See infra notes 31-32 (discussing how apparently otherregarding behavior might provide utility). Whatever the cognitive source of other-regarding conduct,
my point is that directors can and do behave as if they care about something other than their own extrinsic rewards. Moreover, this phenomenon-which I shall sometimes refer to as "altruism," if only for
lack of a better word-may be important in understanding the business judgment rule.
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analyses of corporate law, social scientists outside the rational choice paradigm have developed an extensive empirical literature demonstrating that
altruistic behavior is both common and predictable. In particular, numerous
studies of human behavior in experimental games demonstrate that altruism
is easily triggered by social context (for example, subjects' beliefs regarding others' needs, expectations, and behavior). These studies also demonstrate, however, that altruistic behavior becomes less likely as the personal
sacrifice involved in behaving altruistically increases.
This last finding suggests a behavioral rationale for Van Gorkom's requirement that corporate directors "inform" themselves before they act.
This requirement may play an important role in encouraging director behavior that benefits the firm and its shareholders by reducing the marginal personal cost associated with altruistic director behavior. In particular, the
business judgment rule can reduce an altruistic director's cost of comprehension (that is, the cost of finding out what is going on at the firm and
what the available courses of action and likely consequences might be) and
also can reduce a director's cost of confrontation (that is, the cost of demanding more information from management or challenging a management-recommended course of action). The business judgment rule may
thus provide a valuable second-best solution to the problem of encouraging
director care in situations where courts cannot easily assess the substantive
quality of directors' business decisions.
I.

THE ENIGMA OF THE CORPORATE BOARD

In addressing the puzzle of the business judgment rule, it may be useful
to begin by contemplating a larger mystery: the mystery of the corporate
board. Public corporations control the lion's share of profit-making activity
in the U.S. economy. Public corporations, in turn, are controlled by boards
of directors. 9 Although a number of groups-most obviously, shareholders-have equitable claims of one sort or another on the assets and earnings
of the public firm, as a legal matter, the control over those assets and earnings rests firmly in the hands of the board. 0 In other words, directors of
U.S. public corporations control tens of trillions of dollars of (mostly) other
people's money."1
9 See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8,

§ 141(a) (1991) ("The business and affairs of every corporation

organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except
as may be otherwise provided ... in its certificate of incorporation."). Although the language of the
Delaware statute suggests this is a default rule, as a practical matter a board of directors is a universal
attribute of large firms.
10 Although it has become commonplace for corporate scholars to focus on the shareholders' economic interest in the firm, other groups also make investments in public corporations that leave them
vulnerable to director misbehavior. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production
Theory of CorporateLaw, 85 VA. L. REv. 247 (1999) (discussing vulnerability of other groups such as
managers, employees, and creditors).
1 As of June 30, 2001, the market value of corporate equities in domestic corporations approxi-

96:675 (2002)

In Praiseof Procedure

Why should we expect them to exercise this control responsibly, for
the benefit of the firm and its shareholders? If we only consider directors'
financial incentives, the answer to this question is not obvious; financial
carrots and sticks are notably missing from the boardroom. Consider the
question of carrots first. Traditionally, corporate directors receive a fixed
annual fee for their services.12 This compensation arrangement presents a
director with the following choice: either she can invest extensive time and
effort to find out what's going on at the firm and then confront the firm's
CEO when he has made a bad decision, or she can approve whatever the
CEO proposes. Both approaches pay the same.
To remedy this lack of incentive, many firms have begun to pay all or
part of their directors' fees in the form of shares of the company's stock.
This development has been applauded as a means of tying directors' financial interests to those of other shareholders.' 3 It is important, however, to
be realistic about just how weak these ties often are. In large, publicly-held
corporations, any single director's efforts at care are likely to have only an
infinitesimal effect on the price of her firm's stock when compared with
other factors such as industry shifts, broader stock market movements, and
changes in technology, competition, and consumer demand (not to mention
the efforts of her fellow directors).14 Even when a director owns shares, on
average she can expect relatively little 15direct personal gain from devoting
time and energy to overseeing the firm.
What about financial sticks? Corporate law imposes on directors a
"duty of loyalty" that exposes them to potential personal liability if they use
their corporate powers for their own pecuniary benefit. Put more bluntly,
the duty of loyalty deters directors from stealing corporate assets.' 6 But if
we want directors to do a good job, it is not enough simply to discourage
mated $14 trillion. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds Accounts of the
United States, Sept. 18, 2001, at 90 tbl.L.213. Although directors often own shares in the firms on
whose boards they sit, the law does not require this, and in any case directors' holdings make up only a
small fraction of total market value.
12 ROBERTC. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 108-09 (1986).
13 See, e.g., Charles M. Elson, The Duty of Care, Compensation,and Stock Ownership, 63 U. CIN.
L. REv. 649, 652-53 ("Corporations should pay their directors' annual fees in company stock... ").
14 For similar reasons, the possibility that a declining stock price might trigger a hostile takeover is
unlikely to spur the average director to significant effort.
1s This is especially true if the director's holdings account for only a small portion of her investment
portfolio. If her holdings comprise a large percentage of her portfolio, another problem arises: the director's financial interests may diverge substantially from those of more-diversified shareholders because
she is exposed to the "firm-specific" risks to which they are indifferent. See, e.g., RICHARD A.
BREALEY & STE\vART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 179-80 (6th ed. 1990) (discuss-

ing diversified investors' indifference to firm-specific risks).
16 Unlike the business judgment rule, the duty of loyalty imposes a substantive standard of "fairness" except in cases in which the transaction at issue was approved by either a majority of the remaining disinterested directors, or a majority of the firm's disinterested shareholders. See, e.g., CLARK,
supra note 12, at 141-262.
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them from using their power to serve themselves. We must somehow encourage them to use their power to serve the firm and its shareholders. This

means, among other things, that we must somehow encourage directors to
use their power carefully, thoughtfully, and non-negligently.

Here the business judgment rule comes into play, in a counterintuitive
fashion. Case law describes the rule as a presumption that a firm's directors
have, in fact, met their duty of care. A plaintiff can only overcome this presumption if she demonstrates that the directors did not act "on an informed

basis," that they did not act "in good faith," or that they did not act "in the
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company."' 17 As a practical matter, the last two elements ("good faith" and
"honest belief') are presumed in cases in which directors do not have the
sorts of personal conflicts of interest that give rise to duty of loyalty ques-

tions.' 8 Whetier or not the business judgment rule protects a particular

board decision accordingly usually turns solely on whether that decision
was "informed." In Smith v. Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court
held that the board's decision would be deemed informed unless the direc-

tors had been not just negligent, but grossly negligent in failing to inform
themselves, before acting, "of all material information reasonably available
to them."'19 Disinterested directors who pass this test are insulated from liability, no20matter how stupid and disastrous a course of action they choose
to follow.

17 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,
812 (Del. 1984)). The business judgment rule thus has essentially two parts. The first is an inquiry into
subjective motivation: can the plaintiff show that the board did not act in "good faith" and with "an honest belief that their actions were in the best interests of the corporation"? The second part is an inquiry
into procedure: can the plaintiffshow that the directors did not "inform" themselves before acting?
18 See, e.g., id. at 873 (noting in duty of care case focusing on whether directors were informed that
"there were no allegations of fraud, bad faith, or self-dealing" and that therefore "considerations of motive are irrelevant to the issue before us").
19 Id. at 872 (quoting Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812). The application of a gross negligence standard
makes it significantly more difficult to establish that directors are not informed, raising the question of
why we should expect directors to pay attention even to the business judgment rule's modest procedural
requirements. See infra note 61 (suggesting some answers).
20 Even if a board were found to have been grossly negligent in failing to inform itself, other barriers protect directors from personal liability. For example, in the wake of Van Gorkom, the Delaware
legislature amended the general corporation law to allow corporations to adopt charter provisions that
eliminate director liability for breach of the duty of care. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)
(1991); see also Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness,and the BehavioralFoundations of CorporateLaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1790-91 (2001) (discussing other barriers to director liability, including the rules of derivative suit procedure, indemnification rights, and directors'
liability insurance, and concluding that "as a practical matter, a director is more likely to be hit by lightning after leaving her board meeting than she is to pay damages").
The fact that directors are unlikely to pay damages even in situations in which they have been
grossly negligent in failing to inform themselves gives rise to the question of why they might bother to
meet even the business judgment rule's modest procedural requirements. See infra note 61 (suggesting
an answer to this question).
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There are several important questions associated with this focus on
process as a basis for liability. First, why are courts so reluctant to inquire
into the wisdom of corporate directors' decisions? Judges and jurors presented with other types of tort cases are regularly called upon to decide
whether a particular defendant's conduct meets or falls short of the standard
of care that would be exercised by the reasonably prudent person. Why excuse corporate directors' decisions from this sort of substantive scrutiny?
There is a standard answer to this first question. Judicial oversight of
corporate directors' decisions may be undesirable because the business
world is extraordinarily complex, opaque, and uncertain. As a result, it can
be impossible for a court to reliably assess, after the fact, whether a board's

decision was reasonable when it was made.21 (As Professor and former

Delaware Chancellor William Allen has put it, "the board has all the information and the courts don't. '22) With the benefit of hindsight, even the
wisest board decision may seem foolish if it leads to disaster, as wise decisions can in the uncertain world of business. Imposing a negligence standard on corporate directors could lead to unacceptable levels of legal error

dismiss meritorious cases and award damages in cases withas courts both
23
out merit.
So it may make sense for corporate law to discourage courts from second-guessing corporate directors' business judgments.2 4 But there remains
21 See infra text accompanying notes 61-62 (discussing this problem and the implications for courts'
abilities to assess damages in duty of care cases). Sometimes directors may pursue a course of action so
imprudent that their lack of care is obvious. In such situations, a shareholder might pursue a claim
against the directors for corporate "waste." The waste doctrine permits directors to be held liable for
corporate transactions in which the consideration received by the firm is "so disproportionately small as
to lie beyond the range at which any reasonable person might be willing to trade." Lewis v. Vogelstein,
699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997) (discussing waste standard). Substance is the focus of the inquiry,
not process.
22 Linda Keslar, The Architect, THE DEAL, Feb. 13, 2001, at http://www.law.com/cgibin/gx.cgi/AppLogic+FTContentServer?pagename=lawIView&c=Article&cid=ZZZIH4lM4JC&live=rue
&cst=l&pc=0&pa=0 (quoting Allen); see also Lewis, 699 A.2d at 336 ("Courts are ill-fitted to attempt
to weigh the 'adequacy' of consideration [received in corporate transactions] or, ex post, to judge
appropriate degrees of business risk."); Allen, supra note 2, at 1296 ("[Clourts are ill-equipped to
determine after-the-fact whether a particular business decision was reasonable in the circumstances
confronting the corporation."). For further explanation of this pattern, see Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A.
Stout, DirectorAccountability and the Mediating Role of the CorporateBoard, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403
(2001).
23 The first sort of error undermines, perhaps fatally, the value of civil liability as an instrument for
deterring director carelessness. The second leads to other evils, including fearful directors who avoid
any risky enterprise and "strike suits" brought by hungry plaintiffs' lawyers who file complaints in the
wake of any business failure. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886-87 (2d Cir. 1982) (citing these concers). See generally Lynn A. Stout, Type I Error,Type 11 Error,and the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 711 (1996) (discussing both types of legal error).
24 A cynic might also note that a jurisprudential rule that insulates directors from liability may also
serve judges' self-interest by discouraging plaintiffs from filing or pursuing cases. See Stephen Bainbridge & Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way Everybody Else Does-Boundedly):
Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 EMoRY L.. (forthcoming 2002) (arguing that judges
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the overarching riddle of why, if directors are neither financially rewarded
for care nor legally sanctioned for negligence, we should expect them to do
a good job for the firm and its shareholders.
One potential answer may be that corporate directors want to do a good
job because they fear not legal sanctions but "social sanctions"--loss of
reputation, disapproving remarks, hostile glances, even social shunning.
This possibility has attracted much attention from corporate scholars in recent years.25 Yet there are a number of reasons to suspect that for most directors, most of the time, the fear of social sanctions provides only a weak
motive for exercising care. As just noted, the uncertainty of the business
world can make it hard for external observers to gauge whether a business
fiasco reflects negligence or bad luck. Indeed, Van Gorkom illustrates how
it can be difficult even to determine whether there has been a fiasco. 26 Directors also are insulated from social pressures because they reach their decisions behind closed doors, and minutes of director meetings are not public
documents. 27 This makes it hard for an outsider to finger the party responsible for a bad decision: did the director in question propose the idea, approve it enthusiastically, or dissent? Similarly, outside the rare case in
which a board decision attracts significant media attention, there seems little reason to expect that a director's social circle would even know, much
less care, about her performance in the boardroom.
For these and other reasons, 28 the possibility of social sanctions alone
seems insufficient to explain why directors who are insulated from legal liability for negligence might bother to expend the time and effort necessary
to exercise care. There also remains the question of what is gained by imseeking to reduce their own workload and avoid certain types of cases may favor rules that allow them
to dismiss cases).
25 See, e.g., Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44
UCLA L. REv. 1009 (1997); David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in CorporateLaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811
(2001); Melvin A. Eisenberg, CorporateLaw and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1253 (1999). See
generally Blair & Stout, supranote 20, at 1793-97 (discussing this argument).
26 See infra text accompanying notes 61-62 (discussing difficulty of determining whether Trans Union shareholders suffered any loss).
27 See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (1991) (providing that shareholders can only inspect corporate
records if they show a "proper purpose").
28 Under the homo economicus model, it is difficult to explain why purely self-interested observers
would bother to impose social sanctions on careless directors, or why purely self-interested directors
would care if they did. See Blair & Stout, supra note 20, at 1749 n.27, 1801-02 (discussing these
questions). In theory, directors might care about their reputations because a bad reputation might reduce
the likelihood of being invited to join other boards. As an empirical matter, however, it is unusual for
directors of for-profit corporations to serve on multiple boards. See Stephen P. Ferris et al., Monitoring
by Directors with Multiple Board Appointments: Corporate Performance and Managerial Fraud 3 (1999)
(unpublished manuscript on file with the author), available at http://papers.ssm.com/
paper.taftabstract-id'167288 (reporting results of empirical study of sample of 45,000 directors that
found that only 4% sat on three or more boards, and that even among the Fortune 500 companies, fewer
than 20% sat on three or more boards). This suggests that the prospect of material reward through other
directorships is likely to be a weak influence on director behavior.
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posing on directors the purely procedural requirement that they inform
themselves, before acting, of the material information reasonably available
to them.
This second question is the focus of my inquiry.29 I believe that to answer it-and to begin to solve the larger mystery of why we expect direc-

tors of public corporations to do a reasonably good job of looking out for
the interests of the firm-we must begin by recognizing a fundamental, if
generally unstated, reality of the modem corporate board. This reality is
that the social institution of the boardof directorsis built on the expectation
of directoraltruism.
II. ALTRUISM AND ITS DETERMINANTS: SOME EVIDENCE
FROM SOCIAL DILEMMAS

In a symposium devoted to corporate law, it may seem jarring to come
across a word like "altruism." This may be due in part to the common tendency to think of altruism in terms of such acts as the anonymous donation
of a large sum to charity, or a healthy individual's decision to donate a kidney to an ailing stranger. 30 In arguing that corporate directors are motivated

in part by altruism, I am not proposing that they can or should be expected
to endure such exaggerated forms of self-sacrifice. Nor am I suggesting
that their altruism is necessarily directed toward any particular individual or
group of individuals. Rather, I am suggesting that corporate directors try to
"do the right thing"--to serve the best interests of the firm and its shareholders-even though they are not likely to reap any significant personal fi-

nancial rewards if they do, or to suffer any personal penalty if they do not.
This is a far weaker and more impersonal kind of altruism than the sort
associated with donating a kidney. In lay terms, it might be better described

as principle, moral obligation, sense of responsibility, or sense of duty. In
29 It is worth noting two other puzzles associated with business judgment rule cases. One is the
question of why, when courts refuse to hold directors liable under a negligence standard, they nevertheless insist in dicta that directors have a duty to exercise due care. See Blair & Stout, supra note 20, at
1791-99 (discussing this pattern and offering an explanation); see also infra text accompanying notes
47-48 (discussing "expressive" function of duty-of-care cases). Another puzzle is why we expect the
threat of liability for failing to meet the business judgment rule's procedural requirements to change directors' perceived opportunity costs, given the problem of assessing damages in such cases. See infra
note 61 (discussing this problem).
30 See Amy Argetsinger, Johns Hopkins Lands Gift of $100 Million: Money Will Fund Attack on

Malaria, WASH. POST, May 7, 2001, at Al (reporting anonymous donation of $100 million); Susan
Okie, Organ Exchanges Push Boundaries; New Tactics to Attract Living Donors Raise Issues ofEthics
and Altruism, WASH. POST, June 9, 2001, at Al (reporting that the fastest-growing group of living kidney donors consists of individuals who wish to donate to strangers, and quoting medical ethicist that
"[the initial concern was that human beings aren't really that altruistic and, therefore, we're suspicious
of the mental state of the donor," but that "[ilt turns out that there are people who are that altruistic").
The fact that economic theory, with its assumption of rational and self-interested behavior, has had a
tremendous influence on contemporary corporate scholarship may also have contributed to a tendency to
disregard the possibility of altruism in discussions ofcorporate governance.
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the parlance of the economist, the phenomenon could be described as a case
of "other-regarding revealed preferences." 3' But whatever label one prefers, altruism is the key to understanding both the social institution of the
corporate board and the puzzle of the business judgment rule.
How can one go about thinking formally about altruism? Economic
theory alone, with its emphasis on the homo economicus model of human
behavior, offers little guidance in understanding whether and under what
circumstances people behave in an other-regarding fashion. 32 Help is available elsewhere, however, in the broader social sciences literature. As an
example, I would like to focus on some of the evidence on altruism and its
determinants that can be found in the hundreds of studies that have been
published on human
behavior in a type of experimental game known as a
"social dilemma." 33
Social dilemma experiments are designed to place the subjects who
play them in situations in which their self-interest clearly conflicts with the
interests of the other players. This is done by presenting the players with
payoff functions that resemble those of the well-known "prisoner's dilemma" of game theory.34 As in the case of the prisoner's dilemma, players
31 See supra note 8 (discussing revealed preferences). By employing this phrase I emphasize that I
am focusing on what people do rather than how theyfeel. Altruistic behavior may be motivated by guilt
ego, religious training, or other concerns that lead individuals to conclude that they will feel better, subjectively, if they behave as if they care for others. Although the question of motivation is both interesting and important, it is subject to considerable debate, and in any case lies beyond the scope of my
argument. Instead, I adopt a simple behavioral approach, which nevertheless permits a number of useful
predictions about altruistic behavior, without need to inquire more deeply into its cognitive origins.
32 It is something of a standard move for economists to suggest that economic theory does not preclude altruism; people will behave altruistically if they get pleasure (utility) from helping others, making
altruism consistent with self-interest. Apart from the obviously tautological nature of this argument, it
provides little or no guidance to someone trying to understand when and under what circumstances
altruistic behavior is likely to occur. And as a practical matter, most rational choice analysis implicitly
assumes that people in fact care only about their own welfare and not about the welfare of others.
33 See generallyRobyn M. Dawes & Richard H. Thaler, Cooperation, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 187 (1988)
(summarizing studies); Robyn M. Dawes et al., Cooperationfor the Benefit of Us-Not Me, or My Conscience, BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 97 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990) (reviewing studies); Robyn M.
Dawes, SocialDilemmas, 31 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 169, 182-188 (1980) (reviewing results of numerous
studies) [hereinafter Dawes, Social Dilemmas]; David Sally, Conversation and Cooperation in Social
Dilemmas: A Meta-Analysis of Experimentsfrom 1958 to 1992, 7 RATIONALITY & Soc'Y 58 (1995)
(summarizing over 100 studies done between 1958 and 1992); Toshio Yamagishi, The Structural
Goal/Expectation Theory of Cooperation in Social Dilemmas, 3 ADVANCES INGROUP PROCESSES 51
(1986) (summarizing results of several studies).
34 An example is the "give some" game. See Dawes, Social Dilemmas, supra note 33, at 179-180
(describing typical give some game). In this game, a group of n subjects is provided with a monetary
stake of, say, $10 each. They are then asked to choose between either keeping the $10 for themselves or
contributing some portion, or even all, to a common "investment pool." The subjects are told that any
money contributed to the pool will be multiplied by a factor of n-I or less, and then redistributed pro
rata. Because each subject shares in the pool without regard to whether she contributes, the best strategy
for the selfish player is to contribute nothing. However, the best strategy for the group requires all the
players to contribute $10.
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must choose between either "cooperating," or "defecting." As in the case of
the prisoner's dilemma, each player maximizes her personal gains by defecting, even though the group as a whole maximizes its total payoff if all
cooperate.
Rational, self-interested subjects asked to play a single round of a social dilemma game with strangers would always choose to defect.35 Real
people, it turns out, behave far more cooperatively. As a general rule, so-

cial scientists have found that cooperation rates in "one-shot" social di-

lemma experiments average about fifty percent. 36 This finding supports the
claim that altruistic behavior is in fact quite common. Bit it also supports
the claim that selfish behavior is common. After all, if people were always
altruistic, we would observe one hundred percent cooperation rates, just as
we would observe no cooperation if people were purely selfish. What determines why one person cooperates when another does not, or .why the
same person might cooperate in one social dilemma game and not in another?
Four decades of work and hundreds of published studies suggest an answer. Cooperationrates in social dilemmas appear to be determinedprimarily by social context, tempered by considerationsofpersonal cost.37 To
the scholar accustomed to the vocabulary of rational choice, the phrase "social context" may seem unfamiliar and indeed a bit mushy. This is because

social context encompasses such factors as individuals' perceptions of others' needs, perceptions of others' expectations, perceptions of how others
are likely to behave, and perceptions of how their own choices affect others.
Self-interested actors should be indifferent to such matters unless they
somehow change their own payoffs. Real people turn out to be extremely

responsive to them.
Social dilemma experiments provide compelling evidence of this re35

When a group of subjects plays social dilemmas repeatedly with each other, it can become rational for selfish players to cooperate if they fear that if they do not, they will be punished by their fellow players' defections in future rounds. Thus "tit-for-tat" can induce rational and selfish players to
cooperate when the end-game point is unknown. See Blair & Stout, supra note 20, at 1762-63 & n.56
(discussing theory of repeated games). Contrary to the prediction of rational choice, however, social
scientists have found that average cooperation rates are actually lower in repeated social dilemma experiments than in "one-shot" games. See id. at 1767 (offering explanation for this finding).
36 See, e.g., Dawes & Thaler, supra note 33, at 189 (noting that subjects on average contribute 40%
to 60% in social dilemma contribution games); Sally, supra note 33, at 62 (finding mean cooperation
rate of 47.4% for sample of over 130 social dilemma studies).
37 See, e.g., Dawes, Social Dilemmas, supra note 33, at 185 (reporting that cooperation rates in social dilemmas were responsive to, inter alia, both expectations about others' behavior and calculations of
personal payoffs); Sally, supra note 33, at 75-78 (finding in statistical survey of over one hundred studies that although cooperation rates decreased as the rewards from defecting increased, "[a]ll the other
variables that should affect a selfish decider either are not [statistically] meaningful or have the opposite
sign," while "factors that should not affect a participant guided by self-interest are, in fact, quite important," including subgroup identity, instructions from the experimenter, and the size of the loss to others
from defecting).
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sponsiveness. Although cooperation rates in social dilemma games average
around fifty percent, this figure is highly manipulable. Researchers can
raise cooperation rates significantly by telling (or even hinting to) the subjects that they should cooperate, 38 by taking steps to foster a sense of common social identity among the players, 39 by indicating that the other players
in the game are likely to cooperate,40 or by. suggesting that cooPeration
would produce larger payoffs for the other members of the group. 1 Such
variables should not change the behavior of purely self-interested actors.
Nevertheless, they turn out to be extremely important in determining the incidence of altruistic behavior in experimental games. Indeed, by manipulating social variables, experimenters have been able to produce cooperation

rates in social dilemma games as high as ninety-five percent (almost universal altruism) or as low as five percent (almost pure self-interest).42
It is important to bear in mind, however, that the fact that social context is a key determinant of altruistic behavior does not imply that economic
factors are irrelevant. To the contrary, a second intriguing finding from the
social dilemma evidence-and a finding that plays a central role in my defense of the business judgment rule-is that while people frequently choose
to behave altruistically in social dilemma games in certain social contexts,
they still seem to keep at least one eye on their own self-interest. Researchers have found that as the personal cost of adopting a cooperative strategy
in a social dilemma increases, the incidence of cooperation declines.43 In
other words, when plotted as a function of personal cost, the supply of altruistic behavior is downward sloping. The higher the price of behaving altruistically, the less altruism supplied.
Taken as a whole, the social dilemma evidence offers a foundation on
which to build a model of human behavior that differs in important ways
from the homo economicus model of rational choice. In particular, the evidence supports the claim that most people have at least two personalitiesor

modes of behavior. In some social situations, people predictably behave
selfishly. For example, when an authority suggests they behave selfishly,
when they lack a sense of common social identity with those around them,
when they believe others are behaving selfishly, or when they expect their
selfishness will not be too costly to others, people predictably behave as if
they care only about their own payoffs. In other social situations, people
behave altruistically. For example, when an authority says they should be
altruistic, when they share a sense of social identity, when they believe others are also behaving altruistically, when they expect their own altruism
38 Sally, supra note 33, at 78.
39Id.
40 Dawes, Social Dilemmas,supra note 33, at 187.
41 Id. at 191; Sally, supra note 33, at 75.
42 Sally, supranote 33, at 62.
41 Id. at 75.
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will greatly benefit others, people predictably behave as if they care about
others' payoffs as well as their own. In the economist's parlance, they "reveal" other-regarding preference functions. 44 This only occurs, however,
when the social conditions are favorable-and the personal costs are not too
high.
III. SOCIALLY CONTINGENT ALTRUISM AND THE
BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
Social dilemma experiments by their very nature place the subjects
who participate in them in streamlined and artificial situations. There is accordingly considerable risk associated with extrapolating from the social dilemma context to the business world. Nonetheless, if we are willing to
assume that people's behavior in the lab reflects their behavior in day-today life to any significant extent, a number of valuable insights can be
drawn from social dilemma studies. As an example, consider how the phenomenon of socially contingent altruism may help untangle the mysteries of
the corporate board and the business judgment rule.
Corporate law treats directors as fiduciaries: individuals who are expected to use their control over the corporation's assets and earnings not for
their own benefit, but for the benefit of the firm and its shareholders.
What's more, directors are expected to serve the firm's best interests even
though there are remarkably few external incentives for them to do thisthey are expected to behave, in effect, as if they have adopted an altruistic
preference function. The homo economicus model of human behavior predicts this approach is a recipe for business disaster. Even if the duty of loyalty discourages directors from actively stealing from the firm, it is
irrational for a purely self-interested director to devote significant effort to
the business of directing. Shirking is the only rational response to the external incentives most directors face.4 6
A behavioral analysis recognizing the reality of socially contingent altruism suggests, however, that the board of directors may be a far more sensible social institution than rational choice theory implies. Social dilemma
studies indicate that corporate directors, like the rest of us, likely are quite
capable of altruism-if the social context supports it, and ifthe personal
sacrifice involved is not too great.
Here is where the business judgment rule makes its contribution. Most
obviously, case law on the duty of care may play an important role in promoting director diligence by helping to create a social framework that supports altruistic behavior. As noted earlier, one social variable that has
proven important in determining the incidence of cooperation in social di44 See supranotes 8 & 31 (discussing revealed preferences).
45 See generally CLARK, supranote 12, at 123, 141 (describing directors' fiduciary duties of loyalty
and care).
46 See supratext accompanying notes 12-28 (describing directors' incentives).

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

lemma games is the experimenter's instructions. 7 It is perhaps not too
great a stretch to suggest that corporate directors view judges as persons of
influence and authority similar to the experimenter in a social dilemma
game, and that judicial pronouncements about how directors ought to behave can thus influence directors' behavior even when not backed up by legal sanctions. This possibility supports the view of scholars who have
argued that corporate law shapes directors' behavior primarily through its
"sermonizing" or "expressive" function.48
In this Article, however, I would like to focus on how the business
judgment rule may encourage director altruism in a second and hitherto unrecognized fashion-by reducing the marginal personal sacrifice associated
with altruistic behavior. To develop this argument further, let us begin by
considering the nature of the personal costs that corporate directors must incur in exercising due care. In the case of the independent corporate director
(that is, the director who does not also serve as an officer or employee of
the corporation), the costs of exercising care fall into two broad categories.49 The first category might be labeled the cost of comprehending. This
category includes the cost of acquiring the information necessary to understand what is going on at the firm and what the available options are, the
cost of ingesting that information, the cost of asking further questions, and
the cost of expending the intellectual effort needed to analyze the information and reach a reasoned decision.5
The second category of costs I shall call the cost of confronting. The
principal costs falling into this category are the costs associated with asking
47 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
48 See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 20, at 1796-97; Eisenberg, supra note 25; Rock, supra note
25. It is important to note, however, that unlike some commentators I am arguing that sermonizing
works largely because corporate directors "internalize" the message of the sermon, rather than because
third parties use the sermons as a guide for determining when they should impose social sanctions on
wayward directors. But see Rock, supra note 25, at 1013-14 ("The story I tell in this Article is very
much a story of how a small community imposes formal and informal, legal and non-legal, sanctions on
its members."); Skeel, supranote 25 (discussing how corporate directors can be "shamed" by third parties into better behavior).
49 The case of the director who is also an employee of the firm is more complicated, and I do not
address it here except to note that there is no reason to believe that such directors are not capable of altruism. However, in some circumstances (e.g., when the board is setting policy on employee compensation), they will have more of a personal stake in how the board runs the firm, and their likelihood of
behaving altruistically in deciding such matters is correspondingly lower.
50 To some extent, the director may be able to shift these costs to the firm by causing the firm to hire
outside experts to amass and interpret much of the relevant information. For example, in the wake of
Van Gorkom, it has become common for boards faced with similar decisions to hire investment banks to
prepare "fairness" opinions. The result is a transfer of wealth from the firm to its directors. It may be an
efficient transfer, however, if investment banks that specialize in valuation questions can acquire and
synthesize valuation information more inexpensively than can directors, who are not specialists. Moreover, the costs shifted to the firm may be outweighed by the benefits that flow from greater director care.
See infra note 59 (suggesting that benefits of the Van Gorkom formulation of the business judgment rule
likely outweigh the rule's costs).
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the company's management for more information, or even challenging
management's conclusions when the director does not agree with them.
Such confrontation can be costly in at least two senses. First, confrontation
may be costly to the director if she dislikes interpersonal conflict (as many
people do). 5 1 Second, confrontation may be costly to the firm and its shareholders (and therefore also costly to the altruistic director) if it undermines
cordial relations between management and the board to such a degree that it
works to the detriment of the business.5 2
By requiring directors to inform themselves of all material information
before they make a decision, the business judgment rule reduces the marginal personal sacrifice associated with both sorts of director costs. Let us
begin by considering how the business judgment rule reduces a director's
marginal cost of comprehending. To take advantage of the rule's protection, a director must make sure before reaching a decision that she has both
acquired the relevant data and given herself an adequate opportunity to absorb it. In other words, the business judgment rule gives corporate directors
an extrinsic motivation or reward for following certain procedures. Having
followed these procedures-having read reports, listened to presentations,
asked questions and heard answers-the only additional sacrifice the director must make to reach a careful decision is to expend the intellectual energy necessary to analyze what she has already read and listened to. In
other words, the only extra effort the director must make is to think. It is
perhaps not too optimistic to hope that for most directors this last step entails only a small personal sacrifice-small enough that we can count on
some degree of altruistic behavior.
Of course, an important empirical assumption underlies this argument.
This assumption is that, while the complexity of the business world keeps
courts from being able to reliably measure the quality of the business decisions boards make, courts can still pass judgment on the quality of a board's
decision-making procedures. This assumption seems reasonable. A useful
analogy may be found in the case of the doctor who advises a patient to undergo immediate surgery. The patient may not be in a position to juidge the
appropriateness of surgery as a solution to her problems. But she ought to
become suspicious if the doctor makes his diagnosis over the telephone, before she has described her symptoms, and without doing any tests. Similarly, the Delaware Court of Chancery was justified in becoming suspicious
in the Van Gorkom case when the Trans Union board of directors agreed to
sell the company based only on a two-hour meeting, held on short notice, in
SI Of course, a purely self-interested director would not mind interpersonal conflict. Casual empiricism suggests that in fact people often seek to avoid conflict with others, providing another example of
other-regarding behavior.
52 Again, under rational choice theory this is a mythical cost, because rational choice presumes that
managers and directors are always in conflict because they are always interested in serving only their
own welfare. In practice, persistent conflict between boards and managers can prove destructive to the
firm. See generally Blair & Stout, supra note 20, at 1753-59.
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which the directors asked few questions and relied only on short oral reports from the company's president and chief financial officer.53
In addition to reducing a director's marginal personal cost of comprehending, the business judgment rule can also reduce her marginal cost of
confronting the firm's managers. The rule does this by giving a director an
independent reason for asking questions and demanding further information-in other words, a reason other than pure distrust. In effect, it allows a
director to say to the CEO: "It's not that I doubt your judgment. It's just
that to protect myself, I must know all the facts." Under a rational choice
analysis, allowing directors to "sugarcoat" their demands in this fashion
adds no value. But once we accept the possibility of director altruism in the
form of a sense of obligation to the firm and its shareholders-and once we
accept that managers as well as directorsmay feel such a sense of obliga-

tion-sugarcoating becomes important.
Elsewhere, Margaret Blair and I have written at length about some of
the reasons why participants in firms might want to signal to their follow
participants that they view their relationships as trust-based relationships
involving mutual cooperation and vulnerability. 4 This work suggests how
sugarcoating can allow directors to make demands of managers without unduly undermining such cooperation and trust. The underlying intuition is
that, without sugarcoating, the board that challenges its CEO may inevitably send a signal that it does not view its relationship with management as a
cooperative one, or that it does not expect the CEO to behave trustworthily.
By altering social context, such a challenge can amount to a self-fulfilling
prophecy: the manager becomes more likely to behave selfishly, because
the board clearly expects him to. Increased manager selfishness, in tun,
imposes greater costs on altruistic directors by increasing interpersonal conflict and decreasing voluntarily cooperative manager behavior. Thus, by
giving independent directors an excuse to challenge management in a less
accusatory fashion, the business judgment rule may reduce the cost of director altruism by promoting greater manager altruism.
The end result is that once one recognizes the empirical fact of socially
contingent altruistic behavior, Van Gorkom's expression of the business
judgment rule, derided over the years as "misguided," 55 "analytically un53 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 868-870 (Del. 1985). Similar considerations may explain why courts inquiring into the "faimess" of interested transactions in duty of loyalty cases often inquire not only into the fairness of the price paid, but also into the fairness of the procedure used to
determine that price. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 ("The concept of fairness
has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price."). When interested transactions involve unique goods,
there will often be a range of prices that might reasonably be deemed fair. As a result, courts can face
information constraints in judging fairness in interested transaction cases that resemble those they frequently encounter in duty of care cases. Adding a procedural component to the analysis of fairness under the duty of loyalty accordingly may offer some benefit.
54 See Blair & Stout, supra note 20.
55 Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or Misguided Notion?,
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sound, ' ,56 a "legal disaster, 57 and even as "one of the worst decisions in the
history of corporate law,"5 8 begins to make sense. The Delaware Supreme
Court's decision in Van Gorkom displayed considerable intuitive knowledge of both the business environment and the realities of human behavior.
It also proposed a clever, possibly inspired, solution to the problem of encouraging corporate directors to exercise due care in making choices in circumstances in which courts cannot evaluate the wisdom of the choices
themselves.59
In championing the business judgment rule, I do not mean to suggest
that Van Gorkom was a fair decision. To the contrary, the Delaware Supreme Court's ruling was unfair to the Trans Union board in the same sense
that it is unfair for one driver to be given a ticket for speeding when others
around her are also speeding and she is simply keeping up with traffic. Before Van Gorkom, many in the business community understood the business
judgment rule as a general prohibition against director liability under the
duty of care.6 It was a shock to learn that the Delaware courts would in
fact impose personal liability on directors for breach of the duty of care (albeit on the basis of procedural, rather than substantive, inquiry).
Nor am I suggesting there was any reason to believe that if the Trans
Union board had asked more questions, sought more outside advice, or
67 S. CAL. L. REV. 287, 289 (1994) (arguing that the business judgment rule is "either meaningless...
or misguided").
56 Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director'sDuty of Attention: Time for
Reality, 39 BUS. LAW. 1477, 1478 (1984) (arguing that judicial formulation of duty of care "is both out
of contact with reality and analytically unsound").
57 Fred S. McChesney, A Bird in the Hand and Liability in the Bush, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 631, 631 (2002)
("Considered a legal disaster in 1985, [Van Gorkom] isjudged no less disastrous today." (footnotes omitted)).
58 Daniel Fisehel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 Bus. LAW. 1437,
1455 (1985); see also id. at 1438 (arguing that business judgment rule lacks a "coherent theory");
CLARK, supra note 12, at 124 ("Is the duty of care simply gobbledygook ... ?"); Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director'sDuty of Care:JudicialAvoidance of Standardsand Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV. 591 (1983) (critiquing business judgment rule).
59 Of course, even if the business judgment rule's procedural focus does benefit firms by promoting
greater director care, the rule may still be unwise if the corporate costs associated with compliance outweigh those benefits. I am unaware of any systematic attempt to actually measure the costs and benefits
that flow from the rule, and any such attempt would face significant difficulties. See infra text accompanying notes 61-62 (discussing difficulties of assessing costs that flow from procedural failures). Nevertheless, I strongly suspect that while the rule does impose large costs (hiring an investment bank, for
example, can cost a firm hundreds of thousands of dollars), those costs are more than worthwhile given
the huge amounts of wealth at stake. In the Van Gorkom case, for example, the shareholders of Trans
Union ultimately sold their approximately 12.5 million shares for $55 per share. Smith v. Van Gorkom,
488 A.2d 858, 865 (Del.. 1985); WILLIAM M. OWEN, AUTOPSY OF AMERGER 2 (1986). If greater director care had increased that sale price by even 2%, the result would have been a nearly $13 million benefit to Trans Union's shareholders.
60 This protection appeared to be available to any director who made even the most minimal effort
to fulfill her responsibilities. See, e.g., Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981) (finding
director to have been negligent where she failed to attend board meetings or become involved in any
fashion in overseeing the firm).
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taken longer to reach its decision, it might have chosen a different course of
action. One of the difficulties inevitably associated with any judicial inquiry into process is that it will often be impossible, after the fact, to know
with any certainty what might have happened if a different procedure had
been followed.6 ' We do not know and cannot know whether, if the Trans
Union board had handled the sale of the firm differently, it would have sold
the company to Jay Pritzker or to another bidder, or received a higher or a
lower price. This observation highlights yet another aspect of the Van
Gorkom decision that has attracted the critics' attention-the fact that even
today, it remains uncertain whether Trans Union's shareholders in fact suffered any injury as a result of the board's decision to sell the firm at fiftyfive dollars per share. 2
This uncertainty about damages, however, is not due to the business
judgment rule. Rather, it is due to the underlying reality that justifies the
rule. This reality is that courts often simply lack the information necessary
to assess the substantive wisdom of directors' business decisions. 63 Being
unable to judge substance, they are left with the second-best solution of
judging procedure. The empirical evidence on socially contingent altruism
suggests that this might, in fact, be enough.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the sixteen years since Smith v. Van Gorkom was decided, the case

has continued to puzzle and provoke. One of the most obvious questions
posed by the opinion is the question of what is gained by requiring corporate directors to meet the purely procedural requirement of becoming "informed," if they are then free to make negligent or even reckless decisions.
From a rational choice perspective it seems counterproductive to focus on
process as the basis for liability. Instead of giving directors of public corporations incentive to act carefully, it appears to give them incentive to im61 This difficulty raises the question of why directors would bother to follow even the business
judgment rule's minimal procedural requirements when it can be so difficult to prove damages when
they fail to do so. Part of the answer may lie in the fact that the legal costs and inconvenience involved
in defending oneself in a lawsuit give directors incentive to avoid such lawsuits whenever they can (and
to settle claims when they cannot). It is also possible that directors systematically overestimate the likelihood of personal liability, perhaps because their lawyers encourage such overestimation in order to
bolster the market for their own services. Finally, case law on the duty of care may influence director
behavior not only by threatening legal sanctions, which change directors' opportunity costs, but also by
sending social signals that encourage directors to adopt altruistic preferences. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48 (discussing argument that Delaware case law influences director behavior primarily
through its "expressive" function).
62 See, e.g., McChesney, supra note 57, at 644-45 (arguing that if the court had focused on substantive outcome rather than procedure, it was "highly unlikely" that the court would have concluded the
directors were negligent); Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Why 1Do Not Teach Van Gorkom, 34 GA. L. REV.
477, 487 (2000) (critiquing opinion on the ground that the court failed to address what damage resulted
from the board's actions).
63 See supra text accompanying notes 21-23.
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pose unnecessary costs on the firm and its shareholders by adopting elaborate and expensive decision-making procedures.
The wisdom of the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Van
Gorkom can only be fully appreciated if we are willing to move beyond rational choice, and in particular to recognize the key role that socially contingent altruism may play in shaping the behavior of corporate directors.
Extensive empirical evidence demonstrates that in experimental games, altruistic behavior is quite common-when social context supports it, and
when the degree of personal sacrifice involved is not too great. If this evidence from the lab tells us anything about behavior in the boardroom, a rationale for Van Gorkom emerges. In brief, the requirement that directors
become informed before they act may play a critical role in promoting director altruism by reducing the marginal personal sacrifice a director must
make to indulge in altruistic (careful) behavior.
Far from being "one of the worst decisions in the history of corporate
law," 64 Van Gorkom may be one of the firest. Acknowledging the complexities and uncertainties of the business world, the Delaware Supreme
Court had the wisdom to concede that it was unqualified to sit in judgment
on the substantive wisdom of most corporate directors' business decisions.
Instead, it focused on what it could judge-the quality and thoroughness of
the directors' decision-making process. The result may be an elegant, if
second-best, solution to the problem of motivating directors to use due care,
a solution that focuses on reducing directors' marginal costs of comprehension and of confrontation. Director altruism can do the rest--or at least,
enough of the rest to make the corporate board a viable business institution.

64 Fischel, supra note 58, at 1455.
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